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ESSAY
ON LENITY: WHAT JUSTICE GORSUCH DIDN’T SAY
Brandon Hasbrouck**
Facially neutral doctrines create racially disparate outcomes.
Increasingly, legal academia and mainstream commentators recognize
that this is by design. The rise of this colorblind racism in Supreme
Court jurisprudence parallels the rise of the War on Drugs as a
political response to the Civil Rights Movement. But, to date, no
member of the Supreme Court has acknowledged the reality of this
majestic inequality of the law. Instead, the Court itself has been
complicit in upholding facially neutral doctrines when confronted with
the racial disparities they create. It advances the systemic racism of
colorblindness against any race-conscious remedial legislation, while
denying marginalized people relief from unequally burdensome systems
so long as those systems’ rationale is facially neutral. This obstinate
colorblindness has become so pervasive in the framework of criminal
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jurisprudence that race is no longer merely the elephant in the room—
it is the room itself.
This Essay presents the Court’s recent decision in Wooden v. United
States as a case study of what the Court could achieve by saying the
quiet part out loud and explaining the white supremacist motives
underlying presumptively neutral doctrines. The Court can overturn its
misguided doctrines without acknowledging their racial and colonial
dimensions, but fixing the underlying rot in the system requires the
Court to first acknowledge that the rot exists. Otherwise, new “neutral”
doctrines and rationales will continue to crop up to take the place of
those that were overturned. The decline of lenity and corresponding
shifts in fundamental doctrines can only be fully reversed if the Court
is willing to embrace the anti-colonial and abolitionist consequences.

INTRODUCTION
“As every civil rights lawyer has reason to know—despite law school
indoctrination and belief in the ‘rule of law’—abstract principles lead to
legal results that harm [B]lacks and perpetuate their inferior status.
Racism provides a basis for a judge to select one available premise rather
than another when incompatible claims arise.”1
– Derrick Bell
In the second season of Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, the longsuffering
engineer Miles O’Brien is arrested and tried in a Cardassian criminal
court.2 The trial is overseen by an archon, who acts as both judge and
prosecutor.3 At the beginning of the trial, she declares, “The offender
Miles O’Brien, Human, officer of the Federation’s Starfleet, has been
found guilty of aiding and abetting seditious acts against the state. The
sentence is death; let the trial begin.”4 As viewers, we recoil from this
perversion of justice; it’s the stuff of kangaroo courts. Our notion of
justice is grounded in the public perception of a fundamentally fair

1

Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 363, 369 (1992).
See Star Trek: Deep Space Nine: Tribunal (Paramount Television June 5, 1994) (depicting
the trial of Miles O’Brien on Cardassia Prime).
3
See id.
4
Id.
2
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process.5 We would be shocked to encounter Cardassian procedures in an
American courtroom.
And yet, there are two sorts of justice in America. There is the ideal,
guided by strong constitutional limits on prosecution meant to produce a
fair trial for defendants, even if it means the guilty sometimes go free.
Traditional doctrines guide the court to favor the defendant until the
prosecution can overcome all reasonable doubt. And then there is the fast
and loose world of mass incarceration, replete with plea bargaining,
harmless error, qualified immunity, and good faith exceptions. That sort
of justice is fit for a colonial power—like the Cardassians—bent on
subjugating large portions of its populace. That sort of justice would have
little use for lenity. These two systems often exist in parallel, with the
latter cloaking itself in the trappings of the former.
In Wooden v. United States,6 the Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Kagan, held that a series of burglaries committed at a single
address on a single night did not count as more than one “occasion” under
the Armed Career Criminal Act’s7 (“ACCA”) mandatory minimum
sentencing provision.8 In a concurring opinion joined in part by Justice
Sotomayor, Justice Gorsuch indicated that, when interpreting ambiguous
statutes such as the ACCA, courts should turn to the rule of lenity before
analyzing a statute’s legislative history or purpose.9 The rule of lenity
requires that courts resolve reasonable doubts about the application of
penal laws in the defendant’s favor.10
Justice Gorsuch observed that courts have weakened the rule of lenity
over time, culminating in the Court’s current interpretation, which
requires a finding of a “grievous ambiguity” before courts can apply lenity
and find in favor of the defendant.11 This narrow rule of lenity is one
factor that perpetuates mass incarceration and its concomitant racial
disparities. But Justice Gorsuch does not say why this shift in the rule of
lenity occurred. This Essay presents the narrowing of the historical
doctrine of lenity as an offshoot of mass incarceration’s racist roots. That
5

See Tracey L. Meanes, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the
Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 105, 106 (2005) (discussing the role of
public perception in the fundamental fairness analysis of due process).
6
Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022).
7
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
8
Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1069.
9
Id. at 1081 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 1084.
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is, lenity—or rather, its narrowing—is one tool courts use to lock up
Black, Brown, and poor people, and to keep them locked up.
This constriction of lenity was only an intermediate step in the erosion
of constitutional law to permit racially driven mass incarceration. In the
early years of the conservative reaction to the Civil Rights Movement, the
Court both invented new doctrines and revised or abandoned
longstanding ones to police marginalized people and prevent their
recourse to the courts. Even the Warren Court contributed to this reaction,
giving rights access with one hand while erecting procedural barriers to
rights access with the other.12 The Court extended harmless error to
encompass constitutional violations in 1967.13 The Court invented
qualified immunity in 1967,14 then expanded it considerably over the next
few decades.15 Police harassment gained fresh justification with the
invention of reasonable suspicion in 1968.16 Lenity was (sometimes)
corralled to only apply in cases of “grievous” ambiguity in 1974.17 By
1983, the Court began to foreclose the possibility of implying damages as
relief for constitutional violations by federal actors.18 The Court created a
“good faith” exception to its Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in
1984.19 While advancing purportedly race-neutral doctrines, the Court
buttressed the racial hierarchies of the carceral state.20 This is what Justice
Gorsuch didn’t say. Leaving out this critical context indicates that even

12
See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 79–80, 227–30, 260–
65 (2011) (demonstrating how the Warren Court’s procedural rulings reduced the focus on a
defendant’s guilt in favor of procedural questions, thereby incentivizing the legislative
criminalization of increasingly trivial behavior). Daniel Harawa and I will address the racial
dimensions of the Warren Court’s ostensibly colorblind criminal procedure jurisprudence in a
forthcoming piece, The Warren Court’s Colorblind Counterrevolution.
13
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23–24 (1967).
14
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
15
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
16
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
17
See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974).
18
See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
19
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984).
20
See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946, 967–
68 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s construction and reification of race in Fourth Amendment
cases legitimizes and reproduces racial inequality in the context of policing.”); Brandon
Hasbrouck, The Antiracist Constitution, 116 B.U. L. Rev. 87, 116 (2022) (“While the
individual mechanisms [of procedural racism] have often been decried for their role in
perpetuating white supremacy, the pattern of their adoption and application reveals a much
larger problem: the Court is decidedly anti-Black.”).
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when the Court is willing to address the symptoms, it will leave the
disease of systemic racism undiagnosed and untreated.
Part I explains lenity and provides a background of Wooden. Part II
discusses how courts have shifted and narrowed the doctrine of lenity, so
that it almost never applies today. Part III explains the reason for that
shift: courts’ narrowing of the rule of lenity is one purportedly raceneutral means of imprisoning Black, Brown, and poor people. Finally, this
Essay explains why it is necessary for members of the Court to start
saying the quiet part out loud. The Court can overturn its misguided
doctrines without acknowledging their racial dimensions. But to fix the
rot in the system, the Court must first acknowledge that the rot exists.
Otherwise, new “neutral” doctrines will continue to crop up to take the
place of those that were overturned.
I. LENITY
The doctrine of lenity dictates that courts must resolve reasonable
doubts about the application of penal laws in the defendant’s favor.21 In
other words, “where uncertainty exists, the law gives way to liberty.”22
The doctrine stems from the old rule that “penal laws should be construed
strictly.”23 There is no question that criminal laws are penal laws, but
courts sometimes classify civil statutes as penal laws as well, especially
when the civil punishment is on the harsher side.24 The doctrine comes to
American law as part of our common law foundation which was further
enshrined in our Constitution’s guarantees of due process and the
separation of powers. This Part explores this background and uses
Wooden to demonstrate the application of lenity.
Lenity dates back to the English common law assumption that
Parliament only meant to administer punishment when it was clearly
stated in legislation.25 Back when defendants could be executed merely

21

Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1081 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also
Shon Hopwood, Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 918,
920 (2020).
22
Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1082 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
23
The Adventure, 1 F. Cas. 202, 204 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1812) (No. 93),
rev’d, 12 U.S. 221 (1814).
24
See 3 Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 59.2 (Thomson Reuters 8th
ed. 2021) (discussing the types of laws courts have classified as penal).
25
Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1082 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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for chopping down a cherry tree, British judges used lenity to literally
save lives.26
When the concept was imported to America, courts used the
presumption of lenity to uphold due process rights guaranteed in the
Constitution.27
Indeed,
Alexander
Hamilton
noted
that
“subjecting . . . men to punishment for things which, when they were
done, were breaches of no law . . . ha[s] been, in all ages, the favorite and
most formidable instrumen[t] of tyranny.”28 The main justification for
lenity is that “the law must afford ordinary people fair notice of its
demands.”29 The government must give its citizens a clear warning about
both what it considers unlawful and the consequences for stepping over
the line.30 Another justification lies in our understanding of separation of
powers: United States v. Wiltberger31 stands for the idea that judges may
not extend a penal statute beyond the text adopted by Congress.32 The
Court in Wiltberger found that the ethical proscription built into crimes
should only come from the people’s representatives.33
Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in Wooden v. United States34
provides one example of how current Justices think about lenity. William
Dale Wooden broke into a series of ten storage units in Georgia on one
night.35 Prosecutors indicted Wooden for ten counts of burglary, to which
he pleaded guilty.36 A police officer later caught him with firearms in his
home, qualifying him as “a felon in possession of a firearm.”37 The ACCA
mandates a fifteen-year minimum sentence if the defendant has three or
more prior convictions for violent felonies, including burglary,
“committed on occasions different from one another.”38 Even though
26

Peter Benson Maxwell & W. Wyatt-Paine, On the Interpretation of Statutes 462 (6th ed.
1920).
27
Id. at 463.
28
The Federalist No. 84, at 511–12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
29
Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1082 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
30
See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“[A] fair warning should be given
to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to
do if a certain line is passed.”).
31
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
32
Id. at 95 (“It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.”).
33
Id.
34
142 S. Ct. at 1079 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
35
Id. at 1071 (majority opinion).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
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Wooden’s burglary convictions relate to events that occurred on a single
evening, the District Court applied the ACCA and sentenced Wooden to
almost sixteen years.39 Before the government decided to seek an
enhancement under the ACCA, it had recommended a sentence of twentyone to twenty-seven months.40
The case turned on the meaning of “occasion.”41 The government
argued that “an occasion happens at a particular point in time—the
moment when an offense’s elements are established.”42 Justice Kagan,
writing for the majority, used the ordinary meaning of “occasion,” backed
by the history and purpose of the ACCA, to explain why the government’s
argument failed.43 After examining how an ordinary person might
describe Wooden’s ten burglaries and the dictionary definition of
“occasion,” Justice Kagan created a “multi-factored” balancing test that
considered “a range of circumstances [that] may be relevant to identifying
episodes of criminal activity.”44 She directed lower courts to examine the
timing, proximity, and character and relationship of the offenses when
determining whether a criminal event happened on one or separate
occasions for the purposes of the ACCA.45
In an opinion joined in part by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Gorsuch
argued against Justice Kagan’s “‘multi-factored’ balancing test.”46 “The
potentially relevant factors turn out to be many and disparate[,]” Justice
Gorsuch wrote. Anyway, he argued, the creation of a balancing test was
not necessary to resolve this case.47 When there is ambiguity in a statute,
the first stop should not be the statute’s purpose, nor its legislative history,
but rather the rule of lenity.48 He contended that, “[b]ecause reasonable
minds could differ (as they have differed) on the question whether Mr.
Wooden’s crimes took place on one occasion or many, the rule of lenity
demands a judgment in his favor.”49

39

Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1065.
Id.
41
Id. at 1069.
42
Id. (internal citations omitted).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1070–71.
45
Id. at 1071.
46
Id. at 1079 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1081.
49
Id.
40
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Justice Gorsuch pointed to the fair notice justification for the rule of
lenity, as well as to how the rule helped ensure separation of powers and
due process.50 “Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement by
ensuring that an individual’s liberty always prevails over ambiguous
laws . . . where uncertainty exists, the law gives way to liberty.”51 He
detailed how courts have weakened lenity over time and advocated for
courts to return to a strong lenity jurisprudence.52
The next Part of this Essay provides an overview of the shift in lenity
jurisprudence that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century and
examines how courts have diluted the concept of lenity over the years.
The third Part says the quiet part out loud: the doctrine of lenity has
transformed because of mass incarceration’s goal to lock up Black,
Brown, and poor people. By saying what Justice Gorsuch did not, Part III
puts the rot in the system on display in hopes that doing so will create
lasting change rather than simply reform one misguided doctrine.
II. SHIFT IN THE APPLICATION OF LENITY
Justice Gorsuch can only call for a return to a strong lenity
jurisprudence because the Court strayed from the historical doctrine,
adopting a weaker version that provides little protection to defendants.
This part explores just how the law reached that state of affairs. Scholars
have traced the shift in the application of the rule of lenity to the 1952
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp.53 There, Universal was charged with violating wage and hour
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).54 At issue in C.I.T.
was whether each individual breach of the statutory duty owed by the
employer to the employee, one occurring every week, constituted a
separate violation under the Act.55 Writing for the majority, Justice
50

Id. at 1082–83.
Id. at 1082.
52
Id. at 1084–87.
53
334 U.S. 218 (1952); see, e.g., David S. Romantz, Reconstructing the Rule of Lenity, 40
Cardozo L. Rev. 523, 538 (2018) (“Universal C.I.T. begat a slow march that purged due
process and fair warning from the lenity equation.”). See also generally Shon Hopwood,
Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 918, 928–31 (2020)
(describing the decline of the rule of strict construction to the haphazard modern application
of lenity).
54
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 334 U.S. at 218–19.
55
See id. at 221 (“What Congress has made the allowable unit of prosecution—the only issue
before us—cannot be answered merely by a literal reading of the penalizing sections.”).
51
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Frankfurter noted that a simple reading of the text of the statute did not
yield a solution to the legal question at hand.56 “For that reason,” Justice
Frankfurter explained, “we may utilize . . . all the light relevantly shed
upon the words and the clause and the statute that express the purpose of
Congress.”57 Rather than turning immediately to the rule of lenity, Justice
Frankfurter instead first took up the legislative history.58
In support of this claim, Justice Frankfurter cited United States v.
Fisher,59 which asserted that “[w]here the mind labours to discover the
design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived.”60 This language from Fisher would go on to justify the Court’s
shift toward a method of statutory interpretation that looks to legislative
history, the purpose of the statute, and statutory canons before deigning
to apply the rule of lenity.61
The Court later cited the Fisher standard articulated in C.I.T. when it
required thoroughgoing ambiguity to justify applying lenity in United
States v. Bass.62 In Bass, the defendant was convicted under a provision
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which stated
that a convicted felon may not “receive[], possess[], or transport[] in
commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm.”63 While the
government showed at trial that the defendant possessed guns, it made no
showing that he possessed those guns in commerce or in a way that would
affect commerce.64 After analyzing the plain meaning of the statutory
language, the legislative history, statutory canons, and statements made
56

See id. (“The problem of construction of the criminal provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act is not easy of solution.”).
57
Id.
58
It is worth noting that the statute in question in Universal C.I.T. Corp., while potentially
penal, is not a criminal statute. See id. at 219. It draws its statutory interpretation principles
from a bankruptcy case. See infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. While these rules may
be entirely applicable in civil cases, they are hardly appropriate as a source of authority to
derogate the traditional rule of lenity in criminal law.
59
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
60
Id. at 386; see also id. at 386–87 (applying this method of statutory interpretation to a
non-criminal case).
61
As scholars have noted, it is not clear that Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority
opinion in United States v. Fisher, intended for this language to be applied in the lenity context.
See Romantz, supra note 53, at 552 (“Fisher had nothing to do with lenity, fair warning, or
due process. . . . Fisher neither intended to require ultimate ambiguity nor did it intend to
convert lenity to a last resort canon.”).
62
404 U.S. 336 (1971).
63
Id. at 337.
64
Id. at 338.
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by United States senators about the statute, the Court ultimately
concluded that the statute remained ambiguous.65 Only after considering
“every thing from which aid can be derived”66 did the Court apply the rule
of lenity in the face of the ultimate ambiguity of the statute.67 Bass set the
stage for the Supreme Court’s forthcoming insistence on examining every
possible method of statutory interpretation before turning to the rule of
lenity.68
Three years later in Huddleston v. United States,69 lenity continued
its journey from a rights-protective doctrine to an ultimately ineffectual
abstraction. There, Guy Rufus Huddleston was convicted under a statute
that prohibited making false statements in the course of acquiring a
firearm.70 Huddleston argued that because the conduct for which he was
convicted involved redeeming a firearm that he had pawned, his conduct
entailed reacquisition as opposed to acquisition; therefore the rule of
lenity should apply to counteract the statutory ambiguity in the
defendant’s favor.71 The Supreme Court disagreed.72 After looking to the
language of the statute, its legislative history, and its structure, the Court
concluded that the statute was not “grievous[ly]” ambiguous and
therefore was not unclear enough to justify applying the rule of lenity.73
The Court prioritized legislative intent over legislative ambiguity,
asserting, “we will not blindly incant the rule of lenity to ‘destroy the
spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to [and did]

65

See id. at 339–47 (considering text, history, statutory canons, and statements by
legislators, and determining that “the statutory materials are inconclusive on the central issue
of whether or not the statutory phrase ‘in commerce or affecting commerce’ applies to
‘possesses’ and ‘receives’ as well as ‘transports’ ” ).
66
Id. at 347–48 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805)).
67
See id. at 347 (“[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved
in favor of lenity.” (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971))).
68
See Romantz, supra note 53, at 549 (“After Bass, the Court continued to insist on ultimate
ambiguity to trigger the rule of lenity.”).
69
415 U.S. 814 (1974).
70
Id. at 814 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)).
71
See id. at 815 (“This case presents the issue whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), declaring that
it is unlawful knowingly to make a false statement ‘in connection with the acquisition . . . of
any firearm . . . from a . . . licensed dealer,’ covers the redemption of a firearm from a
pawnshop.”).
72
Id. at 823.
73
See id. at 831 (“We perceive no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and
structure of the Act. The statute in question clearly proscribes petitioner’s conduct and
accorded him fair warning of the sanctions the law placed on that conduct.”).
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enact.’ ” 74 Huddleston’s insistence on the stringent “grievous” ambiguity
standard as a prerequisite for considering lenity undergirded its resistance
to lenity in later cases.
In the ensuing years, the Court and the states continued to stray from
the due process and fair warning justifications for lenity. In Chapman v.
United States, the Supreme Court relied on Huddleston and Bass when it
articulated the standard that “[t]he rule of lenity [] is not applicable unless
there is a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure
of the Act,’ such that even after a court has ‘seize[d] every thing from
which aid can be derived,’ it is still ‘left with an ambiguous statute.’” 75
After articulating this virtually insurmountable standard, the Court
refused to apply the rule of lenity in Chapman.76 States followed suit, and
likewise diluted their own lenity traditions. Indeed, “[a]s many as twentyeight states have abolished or even reversed the rule of lenity by statute.”77
Unsurprisingly, since the Supreme Court articulated the “grievous”
ambiguity requirement, it has failed to encounter a statute sufficiently
ambiguous to justify applying lenity.78 As a result of the Court’s
continuous tightening of the standard for lenity throughout the latter half
of the twentieth century, “the bar for ambiguity may now be so high that
lenity is nearly useless to protect individual rights.”79
III. LENITY AND RACE
The rule of lenity sprang from a common-law protection against the
casual application of harsh criminal sanctions. For centuries, it was a
critical means of ensuring that no one would “be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.” 80 Chief Justice Marshall
74

Id. at 832 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 293 (1907); United
States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926)); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
75
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463 (1991) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814,
831 (1974); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)); see also Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (“The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity [] is
not sufficient to warrant application of [the] rule [of lenity] . . . . To invoke the rule, we must
conclude that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” (internal citations
omitted)).
76
Id. at 463–64.
77
William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Statutory Interpretation 369 (2012).
For a state specific example of this, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-104 (“[T]he general rule
that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this title.”).
78
Romantz, supra note 53, at 554–57.
79
Id. at 553–54.
80
U.S. Const. art. V.
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recognized its antiquity and fundamental importance to the common law
system.81 But due process was an early casualty of the War on Drugs,82
and the fall of lenity hastened with it.83 White supremacy quietly became
the predominant driver of American criminal law.84 Lenity could have
served to restrain laws tailor-made to be especially punitive to Black
people. But when we needed lenity most, it vanished.85
The fact that Justice Gorsuch’s defense of lenity86 arose in the context
of the ACCA provided an opportunity to reflect upon the racial disparities
of American criminal law—an opportunity he missed. While Black
people account for less than a third of federal prisoners serving a
mandatory minimum sentence, they make up over seventy percent of
those serving such minimums under the ACCA.87 This injustice is
compounded by the uneven application of the ACCA from place to
place.88 Whether driven by racist statutory schemes, racist policing, or

81

See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
See Paul Finkleman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs,
66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1389, 1399 (1993) (“[T]he war on drugs has subverted fundamental
concepts of due process and a reasonable administration of the justice system.”).
83
But see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 547–48 (2015) (“[I]f our recourse to
traditional tools of statutory construction leaves any doubt about the meaning of ‘tangible
object,’ . . . we would invoke the rule that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity.’” (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25
(2000))). In the white-collar context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, suddenly the rule of lenity
comes roaring back to life. But then, the collars usually aren’t the only thing that’s white in
white-collar crime. See Hon. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Judges, Racism, and the Problem of
Actual Innocence, 57 Maine L. Rev. 481, 491 (2005) (“Everything I have encountered in both
the scholarly and general literature shows that people locked in our nation’s jails and
penitentiaries are disproportionately men of color sent there for street crimes, while corporate
criminals are overwhelming white and rarely hear the prison door slam shut behind them.”).
84
See also Brandon Hasbrouck, The Antiracist Constitution, B.U. L. Rev. 87, 117 (2022)
(discussing the use of the War on Drugs to replace the abolished Jim Crow system).
85
See generally Avatar: The Last Airbender (Nickelodeon 2005).
86
See generally Wooden,142 S. Ct. at 1082–87.
87
See Re-Visiting the Armed Career Criminal Act, Clause 40 Found.: Ad Justitiam (Toward
Justice) (Feb. 25, 2021), https://clause40.org/blog/f/re-visiting-the-armed-career-criminal-act
[https://perma.cc/N5HU-K64R].
88
See Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Armed
Career Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 200, 236 (2019)
(“The use of the ACCA is not always correlated with higher rates of violent crime, as some
districts with little violent crime use the ACCA extensively while other areas with greater rates
of urban violence use it sparingly.”); Haley E. Roach, Note, Location, Location, Location:
How the ACCA’s Categorical Approach Produces Vast Sentencing Discrepancies, and Why
the Sentencing Guidelines Should Replace It, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 511, 511–12 (2019)
(demonstrating how the same conduct in two different jurisdictions, even with the same
82
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both, firearms enforcement is concentrated in urban areas,
disproportionately targeting young Black men.89 The ACCA provides a
stark case study in the racially disparate outcomes of our criminal legal
system, but it is hardly an isolated phenomenon. Rather, it is typical of
Congress and the Supreme Court’s approaches to criminal law over the
past sixty years, applied in an area traditionally reserved to state law.
This Part examines the consequences of courts’ weakening of the rule
of lenity. First, when courts and states do away with lenity, Black, Brown,
and poor people feel the effects more than majority groups. Second, this
Part discusses how purportedly race-neutral doctrines developed to
increase police powers while studiously ignoring the race of policed
people are not at all neutral in their application to people of different
races. Third, this Part sets out race and mass incarceration as an
explanation for the courts’ and states’ narrowing of lenity. Finally, it
exposes the dangerous colonialism lurking beneath the Court’s refusal to
acknowledge this historical relationship.
A. The Majestic Inequality of Lenity
The Court’s weakening of the rule of lenity has disproportionately
impacted Black, Brown, and poor people. Judges’ refusal to apply lenity
when criminal statutes are ambiguous impacts minority groups more than
majority groups for the simple reason that it is more likely that the law
will label Black, Brown, and poor people as criminals in the first place.90
The shift in lenity away from its previous broad application91 feeds mass
incarceration and fuels racial disparities.
Briefly examining recent statistics, as of 2020 Black men were 5.7
times as likely to be incarcerated as white men; young Black men were

application of prosecutorial discretion, could result in one defendant being subjected to the
ACCA’s mandatory minimum and another being sentenced under the guidelines).
89
See Jacob D. Charles & Brandon L. Garrett, The Trajectory of Federal Gun Crimes, 170
U. Penn. L. Rev. 637, 678 (2022) (“Relying upon FBI data, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
reports that arrest rates for such firearms offenses more than doubled in the three decades after
1965, with arrests concentrated in urban areas, arrest rates rising dramatically for teenage
males, and arrest rates five times greater for Black than White persons.”).
90
See Brandon Hasbrouck, Movement Constitutionalism, Okla. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022)
[hereinafter Hasbrouck, Movement Constitutionalism] (manuscript at 3–7) (on file with
author) (documenting how the law punishes Blackness); Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing
Rule of Lenity, 33 U. Toledo L.J. 511, 565–68 (2002) (describing the disproportionate racial
impact of mass incarceration as related to lenity).
91
See supra Part II.
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12.5 times as likely to be incarcerated as white men of the same age.92
Similar trends held true for Black women.93 The disparities are so severe
that there are more incarcerated Black people than white people in the
United States, despite white Americans representing over five times as
large a portion of the overall population.94 Every time judges fail to apply
the rule of lenity, they help sustain these statistics.95 David S. Romantz
has argued that declining to apply lenity allows “the Court to
avoid . . . any pretense of respecting a criminal defendant’s due process
right.”96 These due process rights, which justify the application of lenity,97
are even more crucial for Black, Brown, and poor people. And courts are
significantly less likely to respect the due process rights of these groups.98
Scholars have linked lenity to our current carceral state and its racist
results. Intisar A. Rabb discusses lenity “against the backdrop of the ailing
criminal justice system, whose widespread abuses resulting in mass
incarceration that disproportionately affect black men call for greater
regard for defendants’ liberty interests and other constitutional rights.”99
Lael Weinberger points out that “[t]he rule of lenity stands as a check on
criminal prosecutions when the law is less than clear. This function should
not be underestimated in a time of mass incarceration and high rates of
criminalization.”100 Phillip M. Spector has noted that judges can use lenity
as a means of “quietly wag[ing] a war of resistance” against the racist
effects of mass incarceration “far below the radar of the press and

92
E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2020––Statistical Tables 23, Bureau of Just. Stat. (Dec.
2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p20st.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7Z7-TGDD].
93
See id. (explaining that Black women were more likely to be incarcerated than white
women and young Black women were 4.1 times more likely to be incarcerated than young
white women of the same age).
94
See John Gramlich, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. Has Fallen by a Third Since
2006, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (May 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/06/sh
are-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-prison-2018-vs-2006/ [https://perma.cc/GCZ7-YA
K6].
95
See Brandon Hasbrouck, The Just Prosecutor, 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. 627, 633 (2021)
(explaining how Blackness is punished).
96
Romantz, supra note 53, at 555–56.
97
See supra Part I.
98
See Brandon Hasbrouck, Movement Judges, 97 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631, 640 (2022)
(describing how current judges “do what they were appointed to do: defer to the policy
objectives of the executive and legislative branches of government . . . at the expense of the
values and interests of ordinary citizens”).
99
Intisar A. Rabb, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 Harv. L. Rev. F. 179, 186 (2018).
100
Lael Weinberger, Making Mistakes About the Law: Police Mistakes of Law Between
Qualified Immunity and Lenity, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1561, 1580 (2017).
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academia, and bearing a marked resemblance to the British judiciary’s
[use of lenity to] attack [] the death penalty 350 years ago.”101
Judges’ collective refusal to do so, as evidenced in the twentiethcentury shift in the rule of lenity,102 props up mass incarceration and its
attendant racist oppression. The pattern of denying lenity in cases
involving drug statutes demonstrates the power the doctrine’s derogation
gives prosecutors.103 This shift in lenity, which narrows and weakens
what could be a substantive protection of the rights of the vulnerable, is
feeding into the oppression of Black, Brown, and poor people.
B. Race-Neutral Doctrines Aren’t Actually Race-Neutral
Many ostensibly race-neutral doctrines promulgated by the Court are
in fact rooted in racism.104 Even doctrines developed independently of
American white supremacy can take on racially disparate applications
because white supremacy has permeated the American justice system
throughout its development, often with conscious attention in the
judiciary to maintaining white supremacy.105 As Michelle Alexander has
meticulously catalogued, criminal law doctrines established as part of the
War on Drugs have served to enforce white supremacy through mass
incarceration of poor people and people of color.106 The War on Drugs,

101

Spector, supra note 90, at 566.
See supra Part II.
103
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (refusing to extend
the rule of lenity to an ambiguous application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts, where
the jury had made no finding as to the weight of drugs involved); United States v. Speakman,
330 F.3d 1080, 1083–84 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying the application of lenity to sentencing
enhancements when the number of prior charges was a matter of prosecutorial discretion);
United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 1219–20 (8th Cir. 1995) (determining that the rule of
lenity has no application to the disparities in sentencing for cocaine and crack, despite the
similarities between the two drugs); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir.
1990) (declining to apply lenity to statutory language, resulting in the inclusion of the weight
of an inactive carrying medium in the amount of LSD).
104
See Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment,
67 UCLA L. Rev. 1108, 1120 (2020) (“[The War on Drugs] armed the police with the most
sophisticated, and largely constitutional, arsenal with which to enforce racial subjugation:
racial profiling, stop and frisk, pretextual stops, excessive force, and qualified immunity.”).
105
See Leah M. Litman, The Myth of the Great Writ, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 219, 222 (2021)
(“While habeas is sometimes a device for securing individual liberty, it has also served as a
vehicle for the racialization and subordination of disadvantaged groups and for normalizing
excesses of government power, and that is not merely because habeas courts failed to grant
relief in some cases.”).
106
See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow 59 (2010).
102
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which saw its inception in the 1970s, spurred mandatory minimum
sentencing for drug crimes.107 The racism inherent in these facially
neutral, mandatory minimum drug sentences was thinly veiled. Indeed,
sentences for crack cocaine (the form of cocaine generally associated with
the Black community) were far more severe and draconian than sentences
imposed for possession of powder cocaine (the form of cocaine associated
with the white population).108 The result was a “100:1 ratio between the
triggering quantities necessary for powder cocaine and crack cocaine
sentencing.”109
Mass incarceration of people of color proliferated as a result.110
Unfortunately, Black communities were barred from seeking justice in
connection with these facially neutral but functionally discriminatory
sentencing policies after the Supreme Court’s 1976 interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause in Washington v. Davis.111 There, the Supreme
Court held that an Equal Protection Clause violation requires intentional
discrimination.112 In other words, under the Supreme Court’s current
precedent, it is virtually impossible for a plaintiff to show that a facially
neutral policy with a discriminatory impact violates the Equal Protection
Clause.113 As a consequence of this narrowing of the scope of Equal
Protection, constitutional recourse for the discriminatory sentencing
scheme is largely out of reach for Black, Brown, and poor folks.114

107
Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 Mich. L.
Rev. 1660, 1664 (1996).
108
See Christopher J. Tyson, At the Intersection of Race and History: The Unique
Relationship Between the Davis Intent Requirement and the Crack Laws, 50 How. L.J. 345,
378 (2007) (explaining that under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the amount of crackcocaine required to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence was far lower than the triggering
quantity of powder cocaine).
109
Id.
110
David Cole, No Equal Justice 214 (1999) (explaining that Black Americans are vastly
overincarcerated for drug use compared to white Americans, even though both racial groups
use drugs at approximately the same rate).
111
426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976).
112
Id. at 245–46.
113
See Tyson, supra note 108, at 359 (“In the same manner that Plessy provided a blueprint
for racists to structure the formal contours of the Jim Crow system, Davis empowered modernday policy makers to devise the logic, craft the legislation, and enforce the policies that could
mask racial and discriminatory intent behind a façade of objectivity.”).
114
See id. at 359–83 (cataloguing the rise of mass incarceration and the drug war as racist
practices that have been permitted to proliferate due in part to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Washington v. Davis).
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While insisting on an exacting standard of proof for relief, the Court
simultaneously upheld facially neutral doctrines that effectively enforce
white supremacy.115 In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio,
which held that stop and frisks of citizens by law enforcement are
permissible as long as the officer has “reasonable suspicion”—a standard
that is extremely easy for an officer to meet.116 Police have utilized Terry
to incarcerate disproportionate numbers of Black and Brown
Americans.117
In 1996, the Court further sanctioned racist policing when it held in
Whren v. United States that as long as an officer can articulate an
objective reason for his suspicion, he may conduct a pretextual, racially
motivated stop and frisk.118 The Court further insulated officers from
liability for racist policing through the doctrine of qualified immunity,
which makes it virtually impossible for police to be held civilly
responsible for violating someone’s civil rights.119
The Supreme Court utilized the facially neutral justification of juror
discretion to uphold discriminatory state-sanctioned killing of Black
defendants in McCleskey v. Kemp.120 There, the Court acknowledged
findings of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty—
but nevertheless found no constitutional violation and justified the
discrimination on the basis of the discretion of the sentencing body.121 In
the ensuing years, states have put disproportionately more Black
defendants to death than white defendants—especially when the crime
involved a white victim:
115
See id. at 382 (explaining that facially neutral justifications for racist policies are
“uniquely characteristic of the immediate post-segregation era, particularly the demand for a
race-neutral political and public policy lexicon to communicate the longstanding logic of racial
subjugation and White-privilege in America”).
116
392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). The racial implications of the case were obvious even before
it was decided. See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae at 4–5, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968) (No. 67). Yet there is no mention of race in the entirety of the Court’s opinion in
Terry, nor in the concurrences and dissent. See generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
117
See Alexander, supra note 106, at 62–63 (“In the years since Terry, stops, interrogations,
and searches of ordinary people driving down the street, walking home from the bus stop, or
riding the train, have become commonplace—at least for people of color.”).
118
517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
119
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (articulating the doctrine of qualified
immunity).
120
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (sanctioning clear racial discrimination in the application of the
death penalty). The Court not only upheld that discretion but praised it. See id. at 297.
121
Id. at 305–08.
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Among defendants who were sentenced to death for killing a white
victim, 24.27% (25/103) were executed. Among defendants who were
sentenced to death for killing a Black victim, 5.26% (1/19) were
executed. Even among defendants already sentenced to death,
defendants who were convicted of killing a white victim were about 4.6
times more likely to be executed (24.27/5.26) than defendants
convicted of killing a Black victim. Having corrected a small number
of errors in the data, the overall execution rate is about 38 times greater
for defendants convicted of killing a white victim than for defendants
convicted of killing a Black victim.122

No wonder McCleskey is the vote Justice Powell would have taken
back.123 We cannot in good faith maintain that the law’s protections are
equally applied in such a system.
As these examples demonstrate, the Court often utilizes facially neutral
principles to justify doctrines that enforce and legislate the oppression of
people of color. The shift in the rule of lenity that occurred in the second
half of the twentieth century is another such example.
C. A Different Justification for Lenity’s Shift
The way courts and states have narrowed the rule of lenity over time
corresponds to an uptick in the use of other purportedly race-neutral
doctrines to lock up Black, Brown, and poor people. In other words,
courts’ refusal to apply lenity is simply another race-neutral doctrine that
is not race-neutral because the effect is the imprisonment of a
disproportionate number of Black, Brown, and poor people.124 Like the
race-neutral doctrines discussed above,125 courts began weakening lenity
in the second half of the twentieth century.126 By the time the Supreme
Court decided Chapman, which required a showing of a “grievous
ambiguity” before applying lenity, the War on Drugs was in full swing.127
122
Scott Phillips & Justin Marceau, Whom the State Kills, 55 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 585,
613–14 (2020).
123
See David von Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand on Death Penalty, Wash. Post
(June 10, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/06/10/retired-justice
-changes-stand-on-death-penalty/9ccde42b-9de5-46bc-a32a-613ae29d55f3/ [https://perma.cc
/JP4T-6QN5].
124
See supra Section III.A.
125
See supra Section III.B.
126
See supra Part II.
127
Id.
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And the one legal doctrine that could potentially help defendants who
were themselves victims of racial discrimination—lenity—had already
received the final nail in its coffin.128
Justice Gorsuch did not discuss any of this context in his concurring
opinion. But without this context, it is impossible to explain what
happened and why. Courts’ continued reluctance, with only a few notable
exceptions,129 to grapple with the racial dimensions of the cases they
decide prevents them from addressing the systemic oppression that
pervades every aspect of our legal system. Even if Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence leads the Court down the path of reversing the twentiethcentury shift in the rule of lenity, his failure to address the connection
between lenity and race means that such a change would do little to
address the pervasive rot in our system. Without addressing the
underlying structural racism of our legal system, a reinvigorated lenity
doctrine would be little better than a meaningless guarantee.130
In Utah v. Strieff, Justice Sotomayor voiced what judges often leave
unsaid: she expressed the racial component of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.131 The Strieff majority, in an opinion authored by the
Court’s then-only Black Justice,132 held “that the discovery of a warrant
for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of
your Fourth Amendment rights.”133 In other words, an outstanding
warrant for a mere parking ticket permits police to violate a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights with impunity.134 Justice Sotomayor called out
the majority’s dismissal of the police’s glaringly unconstitutional conduct
as an “isolated” incident135 as instead perpetuating the racial injustices of
the criminal justice system:
For generations, [B]lack and [B]rown parents have given their children
“the talk” . . . all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to
128

Romantz, supra note 53, at 554–57.
See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
130
See Alexandra L. Klein, Meaningless Guarantees: Comment on Mitchell E. McCloy’s
“Blind Justice: Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme and Impermissible Burdens on a
Defendant’s Right to a Jury Trial”, 78 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 585, 593 (2021).
131
579 U.S. 232, 254 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
132
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion in Strieff. Id. at 234 (majority opinion).
133
Id. at 243 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
134
Id.
135
See id. at 242 (majority opinion) (“[A]ll the evidence suggests that the stop was an
isolated instance of negligence that occurred in connection with a bona fide investigation of a
suspected drug house.”).
129
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them . . . . We must not pretend that the countless people who are
routinely targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the
coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe
in this atmosphere. They are the ones who recognize that unlawful
police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives.
Until their voices matter too, our justice system will be anything but.136

Notably, unlike most criminal defendants, Strieff was white. As Justice
Sotomayor pointed out, “The white defendant in this case shows that
anyone’s dignity can be violated in this manner. But it is no secret that
people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny.”137
William Dale Wooden (whose conviction was at issue in Wooden v.
United States), too, was white.138 The fact remains that the narrowed rule
of lenity, like the Fourth Amendment question at issue in Strieff, serves
mostly to punish Black and Brown people. It is also worth noting that
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, advocating for a revitalization of the rule
of lenity, came in a case in which doing so would have helped a white
defendant, not the Black and Brown defendants most commonly in the
clutches of the criminal legal system.
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Strieff, which echoes the cries of the
Black Lives Matter movement, is not unique in her jurisprudence. To
elaborate with just one more example, in Terry v. United States, in which
the Court interpreted a provision of the First Step Act of 2018,139 Justice
Sotomayor vehemently objected to the majority’s “unnecessary,
incomplete, and sanitized” history of the 100-to-1 crack cocaine
sentencing ratio.140 As in Strieff, Justice Thomas authored the majority
opinion.141 In more recent years, at least some judges are willing to
recognize the role of race in American law, even while Justice Thomas
stubbornly refuses to. Lower court and state court judges have also
expressly identified the racial components of the cases before them.142
136

Id. at 254 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
138
Prisoners Personal History Sheet, State v. Wooden, No. 37326-J (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept.
24, 1997).
139
141 S. Ct. 1858, 1860 (2021).
140
Id. at 1864 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
141
Id. at 234.
142
See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 332 (4th Cir. 2020) (Gregory, C.J.,
concurring) (“There’s a long history of black and brown communities feeling unsafe in police
presence.”); Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 2 F.4th 330, 349 (4th Cir.
2021) (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (“Segregation effectively plundered Baltimore’s Black
137
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Recognizing the racial roots and effects of neutral doctrines is the first
step toward addressing the racial disparities that pervade not only the
criminal justice system, but also everyday life; if we cannot call it what it
is, we cannot hope to fix it.
D. The Court’s Persistent Failure to See Race in American Injustice
It’s not enough for scholars and lower court judges to acknowledge the
racial dimensions of criminal law, though. Such awareness must reach the
Supreme Court, which has persistently failed to recognize the racial
consequences of its jurisprudence. Notably, while the late Justice
Ginsburg joined most of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff, she did
not join Part IV, in which Justice Sotomayor laid bare the persistence of
structural racism in criminal law.143 Despite Justice Ginsburg’s history of
jurisprudence and advocacy in pursuit of an egalitarian society,144 even
she turned away when given such an opportunity to speak the truth of
racism in American law. Nor is this failure of courage or insight unique
to Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, while acutely aware of the extent of racism
in America, often joined in the purportedly race-neutral decisions that
enable mass incarceration. He can be counted among the majorities of
decisions weakening lenity, strengthening qualified immunity, and

neighborhoods . . . and the consequences persist today. So it is no coincidence that gun
violence mostly occurs in the portions of the city that never recovered from state-sanctioned
expropriation.”); United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 571, 581 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting) (“It is true that Johnson has not made an issue of race, but we should not close our
eyes to the fact that this seizure and these tactics would never be tolerated in other communities
and neighborhoods.”); Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016)
(“[W]here the suspect is a black male stopped by the police on the streets of Boston, the
analysis of flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus cannot be divorced from the
findings in a recent Boston Police Department . . . report documenting a pattern of racial
profiling of black males in the city of Boston.”); State v. Copley, 839 S.E.2d 726, 731–32
(N.C. 2020) (Earls, J., concurring) (“We should not assume a statement [about the defendant’s
race] is improper when the propriety of the statement is the very heart of what matters to the
administration of criminal justice and the jurisprudence of this State.”).
143
See Strieff, 579 U.S. at 252 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Writing only for myself, and
drawing on my professional experiences, I would add that unlawful ‘stops’ have severe
consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name.”).
144
See generally Linda Greenhouse, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court’s Feminist Icon,
Is Dead at 87, N.Y. Times (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/us/ruthbader-ginsburg-dead.html [https://perma.cc/93FJ-HB7G] (recounting Justice Ginsburg’s life
and work).
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weakening Bivens.145 Despite Justice Scalia’s explorations of the
historical basis for limiting searches and seizures, he authored the
majority opinion giving judicial sanction to pretextual traffic stops.146
Justice Breyer, despite his liberal colleagues’ stern dissents, joined with
the majority in Strieff.147 Both progressive and conservative Justices join
in the Court’s tradition of making sweeping pronouncements in criminal
law without examining their inevitable racial impacts.
But rather than simply paint a hopeless picture, we should explore
potential avenues for shifting the Court’s awareness of the racial
dimensions of its criminal jurisprudence. Justice Gorsuch is particularly
well-positioned for such an awakening. Justice Gorsuch’s reputation as
an expert in federal Indian law and a proponent of strict construction of
statutes against federal intrusion into tribal sovereignty preceded his
appointment to the Supreme Court.148 This tendency was on full display
in his opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma, where the Court affirmed tribal
sovereignty in a large portion of Oklahoma.149 Despite the potentially
large transformative effects of this decision, Gorsuch reasoned that “the
magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.”150 In his
concurrence in Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar
Den, Inc., Gorsuch recognized that antidemocratically imposed laws like
treaties between the United States and sovereign tribes must be construed
strictly, with ambiguities resolved against the government.151 Even at oral

145
See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1973); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). In fairness to Justice Marshall, he was also
a consistent voice against the expansion of warrantless searches and harmless error. See
generally Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment
Seriously, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 723 (1992); Clarence Page, The Legacy of Thurgood Marshall,
Chi. Trib. (June 30, 1991), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-06-309102270600-story.html [https://perma.cc/NP9Y-WRD5] (remembering Justice Marshall’s
opposition to the Court’s permissive attitude to coerced confessions and sloppy police work).
146
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
147
See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016).
148
See John Dossett, Justice Gorsuch and Federal Indian Law, Am. Bar Ass’n (Sept. 1,
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home
/vol--43/vol--43--no--1/justice-gorsuch-and-federal-indian-law/ [https://perma.cc/YXB7-GL
EU] (highlighting several of Justice Gorsuch’s cases favoring tribal sovereignty from his time
on the Tenth Circuit).
149
140 S. Ct. 2452, 2479 (2020) (“Ultimately, Oklahoma fears that perhaps as much as half
its land and roughly 1.8 million of its residents could wind up within Indian country.”).
150
Id. at 2480.
151
See 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“After all,
the United States drew up this contract, and we normally construe any ambiguities against the
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arguments, Gorsuch demonstrated his tendency to give considerable
weight to the benefits sovereign tribes negotiated for themselves.152
These are not isolated bits of reasoning within a few select cases, but a
through-line in Gorsuch’s Indian law jurisprudence.153 This line of
reasoning recently boiled to a head in Gorsuch’s dissent in Oklahoma v.
Castro-Huerta.154 Relying on a tradition of Supreme Court jurisprudence
going back to Worcester v. Georgia155 and legal practice stretching
through the Continental Congress back to English rule, Gorsuch argued
that the states have no inherent power to prosecute crimes involving
Natives on tribal land.156 Gorsuch recognized that “The real party in
interest here isn’t Mr. Castro-Huerta but the Cherokee . . . relegated to the
filing of amicus briefs.”157 He pulled no punches in dissent, calling the
majority opinion a “lawless act of judicial fiat.”158 Gorsuch’s dissent so
thoroughly laid out the legal, political, and international history of Indian
Law that the Court’s liberals simply joined it without writing a word of
their own.
Even when Gorsuch disagrees with a sovereign tribe, he still recognizes
the relationship between the history behind federal Indian law and the
injustice of the federal government’s colonial behavior.159 Nor is Indian
drafter who enjoys the power of the pen. Nor is there any question that the government
employed that power to its advantage in this case.”).
152
See Transcript of oral argument at 17, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486
(2022) (No. 21-429), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2
021/21-429_3e04.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9AR-P4GZ] (“We have the treaties, okay, which
have been in existence and promising this tribe since before the Trail of Tears that they would
not be subject to state jurisdiction precisely because the states were known to be their
enemies.”).
153
See Delilah Friedler, How Native Tribes Started Winning at the Supreme Court, Mother
Jones (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/08/how-nativetribes-started-winning-at-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/Q2G7-E9RZ] (discussing the
confluence of organizing within Native communities and the arrival of Justices Kagan,
Sotomayor, and Gorsuch as the catalysts of a string of significant legal victories for those
communities).
154
142 S. Ct. 2486 (allowing state jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Natives
against Native victims on tribal land).
155
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
156
Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. at 2505 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (recounting the early history
of federal-tribal relations and concluding that “Native American Tribes retain their
sovereignty unless and until Congress ordains otherwise”).
157
Id. at 2510–11.
158
Id. at 2510.
159
See Denezpi v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1838, 1850 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(recounting the government’s past abuses of Indigenous people as a prelude to arguing that
double jeopardy should preclude prosecution of the appellant).
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law the only field where Gorsuch has argued that the United States should
disentangle itself from the legacy of colonialism. In United States v.
Vaello Madero, Gorsuch excoriated the reasoning of the Insular Cases:
The flaws in the Insular Cases are as fundamental as they are shameful.
Nothing in the Constitution speaks of “incorporated” and
“unincorporated” Territories. Nothing in it extends to the latter only
certain supposedly “fundamental” constitutional guarantees. Nothing in
it authorizes judges to engage in the sordid business of segregating
Territories and the people who live in them on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or religion.160

This stance comports with a good-faith originalism161—the United States
was founded in rebellion against a colonial power, with new institutions
to set itself up as the antithesis of perceived British abuses.162 If the United
States is to live up to its founding ideals, it must do so as an anti-colonial
nation.
But American colonialism persists. The destruction of Indigenous
populations—a form Gorsuch recognizes—is not a complete picture; antiBlack racism and the exploitation of immigrants are further symptoms of
the disease—something he does not always recognize.163 Discriminatory
purpose infects much of the federal code. Judge Miranda Du recently
found the criminalization of reentry following deportation was motivated
by racial animus.164 But then, much of Title 18 has similarly racist

160

United States v. Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539, 1554 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
It remains possible that Justice Gorsuch holds other motivations for his jurisprudence,
and this analysis may prove overly optimistic. The reasoning underlying his Indian Law cases
may well be setting up some more nefarious doctrine in another area, a libertarian
idiosyncrasy, or simply a consequence of his greater exposure to Indian Law on the Tenth
Circuit.
162
See also Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71
Md. L. Rev. 1015, 1021–23 (2012) (contrasting the anti-imperial and egalitarian ideals of the
Founders with the political realities facing marginalized people in America).
163
See Monika Batra Kashyap, U.S. Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy, and the
Racially Disparate Impacts of COVID-19, 11 Calif. L. Rev. Online 517, 518–19 (2020) (“A
framework of settler colonialism understands that the three foundational processes upon which
the United States was built—Indigenous elimination, anti-Black racism, and immigrant
exploitation—are ongoing processes that continue to shape present-day systemic inequities.”).
164
See United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 555 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1007–17 (D. Nev. 2021)
(recounting the legislative history of the enactment and reenactment of the relevant statute
(citing Natsu Taylor Saito, Tales of Color and Colonialism: Race Realism and Settler Colonial
Theory, 10 Fla. A&M U. L. Rev. 1 (2014))).
161
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roots.165 The injustices of our immigration and criminal law arise from the
same colonialism as our mistreatment of Indigenous people. When Justice
Gorsuch recognizes that colonialism, he correctly decries it as antithetical
to the stated foundational ideals of America and seeks to exorcise it from
our law. Carrying that project to its logical conclusion by excising the
anti-Black and anti-immigrant strains of American law would be a
massive and radical transformation. Both our substantive law and federal
procedure would face thorough reevaluations, upending decades of
decisions and legislation. Yet if Justice Gorsuch and his colleagues apply
their principles and precedents honestly to lenity, harmless error,
qualified immunity, and other doctrines, it is necessary. After all, the
magnitude of the legal wrongs wrought by anti-Black and anti-immigrant
colonialism is no reason to perpetuate them.

165

While the era of facially discriminatory criminal law is mostly behind us, the animus that
motivated it, and its effects, are not. See generally Alexander, supra note 106 (illustrating how
explicitly racist laws and policies evolved into the modern-day criminal legal system).
Beginning in the 1960s, conservative politicians linked race and crime in their rhetoric around
federal campaigns. See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Social, Political,
and Other Non-legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 23, 40–41 (1997). President Nixon delivered the War on Drugs to bring that
rhetoric to legal reality. See Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs,
Harper’s Mag., Apr. 2016, at 22, 22 (explaining how Nixon’s heavy criminalization of drugs
was meant to target the antiwar left and Black people after Nixon’s campaign rhetoric
associated them in the public consciousness). The wave of “tough on crime” statutes of the
Reagan and G.H.W. Bush eras grew from attempts to covertly demonize minorities without
openly engaging in bigoted rhetoric. See William N. Elwood, Rhetoric in the War on Drugs:
Triumphs and Tragedies of Public Relations 11 (1994). These statutory efforts included
excessively punitive mandatory minimum sentences, giving prosecutors greater tools to
pressure defendants. See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the
Tough on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment
Discrimination, 15 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y 3, 12 (2013) (“Capitalizing on
overwhelming public opinion in favor of more rigid crime control, conservative politicians at
the national and state levels stoked their constituents’ fear of crime waves and endorsed
policies designed to put more offenders in prison for longer periods of time.”). The full scope
of the racism at the heart of the federal criminal code is beyond the scope of this Essay but
will be discussed further in future work.
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CONCLUSION
“At this task they must labour in the face of the majestic equality of the
laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg
in the streets, and to steal their bread.”166
– Anatole France
By failing to engage with the racial consequences of the rule of lenity,
Justice Gorsuch and the rest of the Court—like the majority in Strieff—
perpetuate white supremacy and the colorblind systems of oppression that
have grown from it. The only way to dismantle such systems of
oppression is if institutional actors recognize and verbalize the racist
foundations of their neutrally framed pretexts.167 This Essay sought to
expose the context underlying lenity’s shift that Justice Gorsuch’s
Wooden concurrence left out. In doing so, it shines a light on the pervasive
nature of the rot in our system. But until the Court and other institutional
actors make the racist roots and racial consequences of allegedly neutral
doctrines explicit, mass incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal
justice system are here to stay.

166

Anatole France, The Red Lily 95 (Frederic Chapman ed., Winifred Stephens trans., John
Lane 5th ed. 1916).
167
See Hasbrouck, Movement Constitutionalism, supra note 90.

